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Abstract
The way we perceive the visual world depends crucially on the state of the observer. In the present study we show that
what we are holding in working memory (WM) can bias the way we perceive ambiguous structure from motion stimuli.
Holding in memory the percept of an unambiguously rotating sphere influenced the perceived direction of motion of an
ambiguously rotating sphere presented shortly thereafter. In particular, we found a systematic difference between
congruent dominance periods where the perceived direction of the ambiguous stimulus corresponded to the direction of
the unambiguous one and incongruent dominance periods. Congruent dominance periods were more frequent when
participants memorized the speed of the unambiguous sphere for delayed discrimination than when they performed an
immediate judgment on a change in its speed. The analysis of dominance time-course showed that a sustained tendency to
perceive the same direction of motion as the prior stimulus emerged only in the WM condition, whereas in the attention
condition perceptual dominance dropped to chance levels at the end of the trial. The results are explained in terms of
a direct involvement of early visual areas in the active representation of visual motion in WM.
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Introduction
When we interact with our environment, we are often faced
with noisy or ambiguous sensory information. Under those
conditions, what we perceive can be largely determined by the
state of our cognitive system, including our beliefs and expecta-
tions. This might be adaptive given that our expectations are
broadly consistent with the laws and statistics of the environment.
However, our visual perception might also be prone to the
influence of more volatile cognitive factors. One prominent and
ever-changing aspect of our mental state are the contents of
working memory. Visual working memory is the system that
underpins our ability to briefly store and actively operate on visual
representations. As such, it is fundamental for most activities
requiring vision: from learning a new way to the bus station to
jotting down the bus schedule in the diary. Indeed, numerous
studies have investigated the effects of retaining an item in visual
WM on the attentional processing of subsequently presented items
[1–5]. Recent evidence further showed that a visual search target
is not only processed faster, but also more accurately when it is
embedded in an object that looks like a memorized object [6], and
that coherent motion pulses are more easily identified within
a stream of incoherent motion when their direction matches the
one of a memorized stimulus [7].
In the present study we ask whether holding a visual object in
WM may have a direct impact on the way subsequently presented
objects are perceived, particularly when our visual system has to
deal with information ambiguous to the point of generating
bistable perception.
When viewing a bistable stimulus, the observer perceives it
switching spontaneously and unpredictably between two (or more)
alternative interpretations. It is well established that bistable
perception is prominently influenced by low-level factors, such as
neural satiation, neural noise and competition between represen-
tations at different levels of the visual pathway. Several models
have been proposed to account for spontaneous perceptual
alternations solely on the ground of low-level mechanisms [8–
12]. However, even current low-level accounts of binocular rivalry
[13], where ambiguity is induced by displaying incompatible
monocular images to the two eyes, leave open the possibility of
top-down influences on rivalry dynamics. In other words,
contemporary models that posit neural adaptation and noise as
necessary factors leading to perceptual alternations, typically
consider these factors as susceptible to cognitive modulations.
Other models regard bistable perception as the outcome of
continuous interaction between lower-level and higher-level brain
areas [14–16].
The question whether bistable perception is amenable to
cognitive influence has a long history [17]. A role of subjective
intention, or task instructions, in the perception of ambiguous
stimuli is now well established [18–20]. Although there is
general agreement on the observers’ capability to voluntarily
control the alternation rate between two percepts across a wide
range of bistable stimuli [21–24], the strength of intentional
influences on the ability to reverse varies according to the kind
of ambiguous stimuli being used: within the category of
reversible figures, content-dependent perceptual switches (i.e:
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e59217when the reversal entails a reconstruction of the meaning, as in
the case of Rubin’s vase/faces) are more amenable to top-down
influence than perspective-dependent switches (i.e: when the
reversal entails a reference-frame realignment only, as in the
case of the Necker cube) [25]. Likewise, the effect of selective
attention on perceptual dominance seems to depend on the type
of bistable stimulus. Focusing attention on one of the alternative
interpretations increases dominance durations of the attended
percept in the case of reversible figures [26–28], but not in the
case of binocular rivalry [28]. However, endogenous attention
can influence dominance durations during rivalry when
participants have to track changes in one of the rival stimuli
[29]. Furthermore, the deployment of cognitive resources to
a secondary task reduces the perceptual alternation rate in the
case of reversible figures [30,20], binocular rivalry [31] and
ambiguous apparent motion stimuli [32]. Top-down factors
other than intention and attention have also been proposed to
influence the perception of ambiguous stimuli, in particular of
reversible figures. Among them are knowledge that the figure is
reversible [33,34], prior inspection of the possible alternatives
[35–38], imagery [38,39,20], semantic priming [40,41], and the
motivational state of the observers [42]. Finally, numerous
studies in the neurophysiology and neuroimaging domains
endorse the view that extra-striate [43–45] and even higher,
non-visual areas, such as the frontal and parietal cortex [46,47],
underlie perceptual alternations during multistable perception.
On this ground, Leopold and Logothetis [48] proposed that
perceptual reversals are the epiphenomena of a reorganization
of activity throughout the visual cortex that is initiated by
central, supra-modal cortical structures.
Studying the effects of visual WM contents on the perception of
ambiguous stimuli may provide us with insights on two important
issues: the role of cognitive processes in the build-up of our
perceptual world and the level at which top-down influence
occurs. We tested whether holding in WM unambiguous motion
information can affect ambiguous motion perception. As a control,
participants focused their attention on the unambiguous stimulus
but did not memorize it. This simple paradigm allowed us to
directly assess the influence of the cognitive system on what we see:
if the WM and the visual systems are independent and perception
is exhaustively determined by the input coming from the retina, we
should observe the same pattern of results when memorizing and
when attending to the unambiguous stimuli. Instead, if perception
is permeable to different types of cognitive influence, we may
observe a distinct pattern of results in the two conditions.
Furthermore, a spillover of WM contents into perception would
be consistent with a direct involvement of early sensory areas in
the representation of motion in WM [49,50].
Methods
Observers
Twenty-nine naı ¨ve observers participated in the Experiment.
All observers had normal or corrected to normal vision and were
paid for their participation. Participants provided written informed
consent in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki. Methods
and procedures were approved by the local ethics committee LEK
FB06 at Giessen University.
Stimuli
We employed ambiguous and unambiguous structure-from-
motion (SFM) spheres as stimuli. Each SFM sphere consisted of
a two-dimensional projection of a three-dimensional sphere: it was
composed of single dots rotating rigidly across its imaginary
surface, along the vertical axis, and giving the appearance of
a three-dimensional structure. The sphere rotated unambiguously
when only the dots moving along the front surface were displayed
to the observer, whereas its rotation direction was ambiguous
when both the front and the rear surface were displayed. SFM
stimuli were presented at the center of a black screen (0.43 cd/m
2,
128061024 pixels, 100 Hz, distance 47 cm) and subtended 14u in
diameter. Ambiguous and unambiguous spheres consisted of
orthographic projections of 1000 white dots (55.1 cd/m
2). Each
dot had unlimited lifetime and subtended 0.1u in width and height.
On each trial, the standard stimulus rotated at 70, 80, 90, 100 or
110u/s. The standard stimulus could be presented randomly in the
first interval (as the memory sample) or in the second interval (as
the memory test). The comparison stimulus speed was adjusted
adaptively via a staircase procedure aiming at 75% of correct
responses: after a correct response at the memory test, the velocity
difference between standard and comparison stimulus decreased
by 1.5%, whereas it increased by 4.5% after an incorrect response.
The ambiguous stimulus rotation speed was 45u/s in both
experiments.
Procedure
All participants performed both a WM and an attention control
condition, in a counterbalanced order. As for the WM condition,
the procedure is illustrated in Figure 1, top panel: each trial began
with a 0.7 s display of the instruction to memorize the sub-
sequently presented stimulus, followed by a blank screen for 1 s.
Then a SFM sphere was presented for 1 s, unambiguously rotating
either clockwise or anticlockwise with respect to its vertical axis.
Afterwards, a red fixation dot (0.2u, 12.6 cd/m
2) was displayed: it
was presented over a blank screen for 3 s and over the center of an
ambiguously rotating SFM sphere for 10 s. Then, a blank screen
was displayed for 1.5 s, followed by the unambiguous memory test
for 1 s, whose motion direction was the same as the memory
sample. After 1 s the memory test stopped its motion and was
statically displayed on the screen until participants provided their
response. Finally, a blank screen was displayed for 1.5 s, before the
start of a new trial. Participants were required to maintain fixation
whenever the red dot was presented (i.e: during the display of the
ambiguously rotating stimulus and the immediately preceding 3 s).
The experiment ran on a Dell Precision T390 computer (Dell,
Inc., Round rock, Texas) controlled via Matlab and the Psychtool-
box [51]. Stimuli were presented on an Iiyama VisionMaster
22 inch CRT monitor (Iiyama Corporation, Tokyo, Japan).
Participants were required to indicate their perceived direction
of motion of the ambiguously rotating sphere, by pressing the left
or right arrow keys with their right hand. They did not press any
key if they did not clearly perceive a unique direction of motion.
Participants’ responses were sampled at 100 Hz. As for the
memory task, participants were asked to indicate the interval at
which the faster stimulus was presented, by pressing 1 or 2 with
their left middle or index finger. Participants performed 40 trials
overall, 20 for each direction of motion of the unambiguous
stimulus. They were allowed to take a break every 5 trials and the
whole experimental session took about one hour. Head move-
ments were constrained using a chin-rest.
In the attention control condition, the experimental pro-
cedure was the same as in the WM condition, with the
following exceptions: first, the instruction to memorize the
stimulus was replaced by the instruction to judge whether it
increased or decreased its speed. Second, a 200 ms change of
speed of the unambiguously rotating stimulus was introduced
after 400 ms from its onset: participants pressed the up arrow
key to signal an acceleration of the unambiguous stimulus speed
WM and Ambiguous Motion Perception
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final, no memory test stimulus was displayed and the pre-
sentation of the ambiguous stimulus was immediately followed
by a 1.5 s blank interval.
Data Analysis
We sorted data by direction of the unambiguous stimulus: the
perception of the ambiguous sphere was defined to be either
congruent (when it was perceived to have the same direction of
motion) or incongruent (when it was perceived to have the
opposite direction of motion) with the unambiguous one.
The display time of the ambiguous stimulus was limited to 10 s,
as we wanted to test WM performance after its presentation. For
this reason, a consistent number of percepts ended not because of
a spontaneous switch to a different percept, but because of the
time constraints of stimulus display: on average, 55.4622.8% of
participants’ responses were abruptly truncated as a result of the
end of stimulus display. Figure 2 illustrates four representative
participants’ responses to the ambiguous stimulus during the first 5
trials of the WM condition. Therefore, percept duration in our
experimental manipulation cannot be considered as representative
of percept duration under spontaneous viewing conditions.
Previous studies that examined dominance durations during
ambiguous perception typically allowed for longer viewing periods
(one minute or more) and did not take into account truncated
percepts [28,29,32]. For these reasons, dominance duration was
not analyzed in our study. Instead, we focused on the number of
episodes of exclusive dominance.
Results
The number of congruent and incongruent episodes across trials
was computed separately for each observer in the WM and in the
control condition. Figure 3 depicts the experimental results: the
left panel represents the number of congruent episodes as
a function of incongruent episodes in the WM condition.
Participants perceived the direction of motion that matched the
memorized one consistently more often than the opposite direction
(t(28)=5.04, p,.001). In the attention condition instead, such
a difference was not observed (t(28)=1.31, p=.2), as illustrated in
the right panel of Figure 3. Importantly, the number of episodes
where the direction of motion of the ambiguous sphere was
perceived as congruent with that of the unambiguous sphere
proved to be greater in the WM than in the attention condition
(t(28)=2.81, p,.01).
A more detailed analysis of participants’ responses was
conducted to inspect the time-course of dominance: the results
are illustrated in Figure 4. The upper panel depicts the
instantaneous probability of seeing the direction of motion that
corresponded to the unambiguous stimulus as a function of time
from stimulus onset, separately for each experimental condition.
The lower panel represents the same results in terms of the
difference in instantaneous probability between the WM and the
control condition. Data were averaged across participants. The
lack of exclusive dominance in the first 670 ms from stimulus onset
reflects the fact that the percept took a while to stabilize. Results
are plotted only for time points at which more than 50% of
observers provided data, yet the response pattern was noisier at the
onset of the dominace. Later in the trial, all individual observers
provided valid data and the pattern was more stable. To compare
the time-course of dominance in the WM and in the attention
condition, paired-sample t-tests were performed at each time-point
(i.e. every 10 msec). The grey shaded areas in Figure 4 indicate
a significant difference at the two-tailed t-test (p,.05). Thick and
thin lines represent group averages and 95% confidence intervals,
respectively.
Figure 4 clearly shows that, after an initial tendency to perceive
the ambiguous sphere as moving in the opposite direction than the
unambiguous sphere, average dominance drifted towards the
congruent percept in both conditions, but only in the WM
condition the congruent percept was dominant until the end of the
trial. In the control condition instead, the probability of perceiving
the same direction of motion as the unambiguous stimulus
dropped to chance levels towards the end of the trial. We
therefore further analyzed the data to identify the probability of
switching towards the opposite percept in each trial. Each
dominance episode within a trial had three possible outcomes:
a switch towards the opposite percept, a rebound to the same
percept after a period of ambiguous dominance, and the end of the
trial. We computed the probability of switching to the opposite
percept after removing periods of mixed dominance from the
analysis, so that rebound episodes to the same percept where not
considered as switches. Given that the number of total congruent
episodes was greater in the WM than in the control condition,we
calculated the probability of switching to the opposite percept by
dividing the number of switches by the number of episodes of the
same polarity across trials, separately for each subject and
condition (i.e: the number of switches from the congruent to the
uncongruent percept was divided by the number of congruent
episodes and the number of switches from the incongruent to the
congruent percept was divided by the number of incongruent
episodes). Three participants were excluded from the analysis as
they reported no switches in one or more conditions. The results
Figure 1. Trial procedure in the WM condition (upper panel) and
in the attention condition (lower panel). The direction of motion of
the stimuli is represented by solid arrows above them, their duration
and speed is depicted as a line below them. Observers memorized the
speed of motion of the initial unambiguous sphere in the WM condition
and reported the brief change in its speed in the attention condition.
Subsequently, observers continuously reported the perceived direction
of motion of the ambiguous sphere. Only in the WM condition
observers reported whether the speed of the unambiguous sphere
presented at the end of the trial was higher than the memorized one.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059217.g001
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segment represents an episode of perceived congruence between the direction of motion of the ambiguous and the unambiguous sphere, each
horizontal red segment represents an episode of perceived incongruence. Green segments represent mixed dominance. Black vertical lines denote
the end of a trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059217.g002
Figure 3. Number of episodes where the reported percept is congruent to the unambiguous stimulus direction as a function of the
number of incongruent episodes. The left and the right panels illustrate performance in the WM and in the attention condition, respectively.
Each empty circle represents an observer. Vertical and horizontal error bars represent 95% confidence intervals within the congruent and the
incongruent condition respectively. Diagonal error bars indicate the between-observers 95% confidence interval of the distance from the bisector.
The coordinates of the crossing points of the bars represent the means of the incongruent and congruent conditions, computed across participants.
Only in the WM condition the number of congruent episodes was higher than the number of incongruent episodes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059217.g003
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from a congruent to an incongruent percept was comparable in
the two experimental conditions (t(25)=0.78, p=.44), switching
from an incongruent to a congruent percept was significantly more
likely in the WM than in the attention condition (t(25)=2.05,
p,.05). This result points to a sustained influence of WM contents
on perception over time.
Consistent with this view, the analyses conducted on the first
dominance episode across trials failed to highlight significant
differences between the WM and the attention condition: the
probability of reporting a congruent direction of motion as the first
percept of a trial (i.e: the number of trials where the first episode
corresponded to a congruent episode over the total number of
trials) was comparable in the two conditions (t(28)=1.18, p=.25).
Likewise, the latency of the first congruent dominance episodes
across trials was similar in the two conditions (t(28)=20.54,
p=.6).
Discussion
This study shows that the way a SFM bistable stimulus appears
to the observer is systematically affected by visual information
retained in WM during the viewing period. Concretely, we found
that holding a rotating stimulus in WM produces a sustained bias
in the perception of an ambiguously rotating sphere, as opposed to
merely attending to it.
We tested observers’ performance in two conditions that were
matched in terms of stimuli and cognitive demands: we found that
dominance periods where the perceived direction of the ambig-
uous sphere corresponded to the direction of the unambiguous
sphere were more frequent when participants memorized its speed
for delayed discrimination than when they performed an
immediate judgment on a change in its speed. Furthermore, the
analysis of the time-course of observers’ percepts showed noisier
responses at the beginning of the trial; afterwards participants had
a preference for perceiving the same direction of motion as the
unambiguous stimulus, regardless of the task. As time progressed
within the trial, a sustained tendency to perceive the congruent
direction emerged only in the WM condition. The literature
indicates that fast adaptation mechanisms may affect initial
dominance [52], which is compatible with our results. However,
the large inter-subject variability of dominance onset makes it
difficult to highlight significant effects in the first two seconds after
stimulus onset. Instead, a specific WM influence on perception is
clearly detectable over longer periods of time. In particular,
participants were more likely to switch from perceiving a direction
of motion opposite to that of the prior stimulus to perceiving the
same direction when they voluntarily held the prior stimulus in
WM.
This sustained effect of WM on ambiguous SFM perception is
consistent with recent evidence indicating that visual WM contents
can bias orientation discrimination [53] and speed discrimination
[54] of normal stimuli, after a delay up to 9 seconds from the
display of the memory stimulus. The aforementioned studies
[53,54] showed that, when sensory information is unambiguous,
the contents of WM can bias the way we perceive objects
presented during the WM retention period in a way that resembles
(and potentiates) visual aftereffects. Instead, our study shows that,
in case of uncertainty, WM contents influence how the visual
system disambiguates ambivalent information. These apparently
opposite results could be easily reconciled in the light of recent
neuroimaging and neurophysiology evidence [49,55,56] suggest-
ing that active maintenance of visual stimuli in WM is mediated by
early sensory areas. Here we propose that voluntarily holding
a visual object in WM can influence bistable SFM perception via
the recruitment of neural networks overlapping with those that
underpin perception itself. Sustained activity in early sensory areas
would likewise mediate the repulsive effect observed in the case of
unambiguous stimuli [53,54], via saturation of orientation- or
motion-selective neurons. Instead, when the sensory input is
physically ambiguous, the presence of an unambiguous memory
trace at the level of early visual areas would strengthen the signal
energy in one direction.
Note that to enhance the signal in one direction it is not
necessary for the previously displayed stimulus to be actively
memorized. A number of studies (see [57] for a review) have
demonstrated that physically ambiguous stimuli that cause
perception to alternate between incompatible interpretations
when displayed continuously, can be stabilized by interleaving
their presentation with blank periods. This points to a form of
memory storage across subsequent presentations of the stimuli.
This sensory memory biases interpretation in terms of facilitation
rather than suppression of the prior stimulus, as long as blank
intervals last longer than half a second [58,59]. In our study,
a tendency to perceive the ambiguous sphere moving in the same
direction of the unambiguous one was observed both in the WM
and in the attention condition soon after dominance onset.
However, in the WM condition such facilitation lasted until the
ambiguous stimulus was removed from view, while in the attention
condition perceptual dominance dropped to chance levels at the
end of the trial. This result suggests that the display of the
unambiguously rotating sphere likely elicited a spontaneous
sensory memory trace in both conditions, but only active
maintenance in WM produced long-lasting facilitation effects. A
simple and plausible explanation of such a result is that voluntarily
holding a visual representation in WM exerts a top-down
Figure 4. Time-course of dominance. Upper panel: average
probability of seeing the ambiguous stimulus moving in the same
direction as the unambiguous stimulus, expressed as a function of time
from the ambiguous stimulus onset. Results are plotted only for time
points at which more than 50% of observers provided data. Red:W M
condition. Blue: attention condition. Lower panel: the same results are
depicted as the difference in instantaneous probability between the
WM and the attention condition. Thick and thin lines represent group
averages and 95% confidence intervals respectively. Grey insets indicate
the time points where the tendency to perceive the congruent motion
direction was higher in the WM condition, as evidenced by paired-
sample two-tailed t-tests conducted at each time-point on the trial
timeline.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059217.g004
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by stimulus processing, and prolongs its activation over time.
Interestingly, Sterzer and Rees (2008) investigated the neural bases
of perceptual stabilization during intermittent presentation of
binocular rivalry stimuli (a human face and a grating): they
observed activity in the fusiform face area during the blank period
and found that it was greater following face than grating
dominance, whereas no difference was observed after removal of
nonrivalrous stimuli. Furthermore, activity in fronto-parietal
regions during the blank period strongly correlated with the
tendency of individual observers to stabilize perception [60].
These results suggest that perceptual stabilization may be achieved
via a sustained activation of sensory areas that is modulated by
feedback input from fronto-parietal cortices. A similar correlation
between the tendency to maintain a percept and activity in fronto-
parietal regions has also been observed in the case of intermittent
presentation of an ambiguously rotating SFM sphere [61].
Furthermore, frontal [62] and parietal [63] areas were found to
be active immediately prior to spontaneous perceptual reversal,
thus suggesting that they could mediate spontaneous switches in
perception during constant physical stimulation. If brain areas
traditionally known to be involved in cognitive processes such as
working memory and attention [64–68] play a role in spontaneous
perceptual reorganization of ambiguous sensory information, this
is all the more reason they could modulate the activity of lower-
level sensory areas when observers are actively engaged in
cognitive tasks.
As noted in the introduction, there are now numerous studies
showing that bistable perception is amenable to cognitive in-
fluence. One such study indicates that endogenously generated
activity implied in mental imagery plays a role in resolving
binocular rivalry in a way that resembles the effect of faint physical
stimulation [39]. Our results provide converging evidence for the
effect of voluntary mental activity over ambiguous visual
representations. However, the effects of visual WM and imagery
on ambiguous perception may not be the same. First, mental
images can be elicited by verbal instructions in the absence of any
physical visual support [70–72] whereas WM involves all-or-none
encoding of discrete items and their active maintenance to prevent
memory decay [69]. Second, and more importantly, several
studies show that visual perception influences imagery but not
visual WM [73,74], thus pointing to different operating mechan-
isms that interact with perception in different ways.
Our results can also be viewed from the perspective of sustained
selective attention. The distinction between WM and sustained
selective attention is not clear-cut and it has been claimed that
WM encoding and maintenance reflects actively sustained
attention to a limited number of visual objects, features or events
[75]. Indeed, the concepts of WM and of attentional template
largely overlap in the literature: the requirement of holding a visual
stimulus in WM for subsequent recall has commonly been
employed as an endogenous cue to manipulate spatial attention,
which would shift towards the location in space that matched the
content of WM [1,2,4]. However, there is also evidence that WM
and visual attention are not one and the same thing [76,77]. In
particular, WM templates may not automatically trigger attention
allocation when this is detrimental to performance [3,78].
Moreover, a recent study [7] showed that feature-based WM
and feature-based attention can individually modulate the
perception of motion direction and that their effects can additively
combine. A challenging issue for future studies will be to ascertain
the interplay of visual WM, sustained attention and feature-based
attention in the resolution of the visual ambiguities that we
encounter.
In conclusion, our results indicate that the visual and the WM
system are not independent: our visual world is not uniquely
determined by the information reaching our retinas. Instead, the
ever-changing contents of WM can influence what we see.
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